Election fraud



Election fraud ( Fraudulent Elections, Мошенничество на выборах) is phenomenon of significant and intentional deviation of the official results of the election from the opinions, wishes and will of the people. Usually this term refers to the parliamentary or presidential election in Russia and other countries that suffered the influence of the USSR, but the same term may refer to other countries too.

The election fraud may include the reject of registration of come candidates, the bribing of electors, illegal injection of ballots to the box during the election, robbery of ballots, tricks at the counting of votes and fake final protocols.

The election fraud (Fraudulent Elections) is considered as characteristics of fascism. In civilized countries, the Election fraud is considered as serious crime .

The election fraud seems to be important mechanism used by edro to keep the superior power in Russia at the beginning of century 21.

Statistical analysis of the official results
Promoting of Sergei Sobianin with the extensive use of mobil boxes for ballots at the election 2013.09.08 in Moscow

Some part of the fake ballots counted by the Electoral committee can be detected with the statistical analysis of the official data.

In 2011, the efficiency of such analysis had been indicated by Sergei Spilkin. It is shown, that the hypothesis of the honest election in Russia can be rejected at high significance level. The assumption of the huge election fraud is necessary for the description of the experimental data.

The model of the election fraud had been suggested by Peter Klimek, Yuri Yegorov, Rudolf Hanel, and Stefan Thurner in 2012 . The three parameters are introduced: for incremental fraud \(f_{\mathrm i}\), the extreme fraud \(f_{\mathrm e}\) and the deliberate wrong-counting \(\alpha\). With these parameters, the good agreement of the model with the observed statistical properties is reported. Data for elections in Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Spain, Switzerland, Poland, France, Romania, Russia, and Uganda have been analyzed. For the two last countries, the modeling of the election fraud is essential for the description of the announced results; the model shows good agreement with the observed data.

Ruben Enikolopov, Vasily Korovkin, Maria Petrova, Konstantin Sonin and Alexei Zakharov have evaluated the lower estimate of amount of the fake votes at the 2011.12.04.Election to be at least 11 percentage points lower than the official count (36% instead of 47%) .

Churov saw
Churov saw at the histogram for 2011.12.04.Election of Duma

Pamfilova peak at the histogram for the 2016.09.18.Election in the Saratov region One of strong evidence of the election frad is the so-called Churov saw (Churov comb, Пила Чурова) and, in the case of a single hump, the Pamfilova peak (Пик Памфиловой). The statistically–significant excess of election places with the turn–out or the results for fuhrer and/or his party, that tis integer factor of 1% and, especially, integer factor go 5% is reported. In the case of Pamfilova peak, the statistically significant humb at 62% is reported. Apparently, the criminals at many election places had altered the results in the same way. Some examples of the resulting histograms are suggested below:





Term Churov saw (Churov comb, Пила Чурова) had been suggested after Vladimir Churov (Чуров Владимир Евгеньевич), believed to be the main criminal in organisation of the election fraud in Russia in 2009–2016.

Term Pamfilova peak (Пик Памфиловой). had been suggested after Ella Pamfilova (Памфилова Элла Александровна), believed to be the main criminal in organisation of the election fraud in Russia in 2016–2018.



Scientific fact
Up to year 2018, no alternative description (without the election fraud) of the observed peculiarities in the distribution of votes has been suggested. In this sense, the massive election fraud in Uganda and Russia can be considered as scientific fact.

This concept show good agreement with other evidences of the fraud, in particular, observation of injections of fake ballots, carousels (Карусель, the same team of impostors visit several election places, dropping the fake ballots into the election boxes), fake protocols and even fake election places (that exist in documents, but are not opened for the electors at the election day).

Bribery of electors
The gobernment-dependent electors are informed, that they will get good governmental support if certain candidate gets sufficient support at the election on their institute.

Menaces of electors and gubernators
The electors may be notified that they will have serious problems, if the result of election does not satisfy the bosses.

The governers who did not support the fraud, are dismissed .

Injection and robbery of ballots
The injection of ballots implied either fake protocols with non-existing electors, or robbery of the "true" protocols at the stage of the counting. If failure with robbery of protocols, the number of votes may greatly exceed the number of electors. This excess gives the estimate that or order of 46% of all ballots, finally counted at the election in Russia, are injected by the corruptioners.

Many movies of injection of fake ballots are available online .

More evidences
Several authors mention the election fraud in Russia. The fraud at the election are considered to be so serious, that put in doubt the legitimacy of Russian Duma and that of Vladimir Putin; he appears as terrorist, criminal, who pretends to be elected by the people of the country. The same refers to his party Edro. .

The evidences of the election fraud in Russia are confirmed at every election, and, in 2017.

Resistance to the election fraud
It is believed, that the careful observers reduce the ability of occupants to get illusion of high support of population with the election fraud. See, for erxample, the article Татьяна Фетисова. Отчет о работе на пользу отечеству (In Russian).

Hundreds of petitioners think, that the administrations of civilised countries should not recognize the legitimacy of the elections in Russia. .

Fake election committees
Some local election commissions exist as closed clubs; neither observers, nor even electors take part in the election. The member of the fake election committees get the ballots, fill them by themselves and submit to the Central Election committee as if the real election took place .

Alteration of final protocols
If the result of the election at some local election committee looks too sad for the occupants, they may just re-write the resulting protocols. Many observations of such alteration are reported ; often, the final protocol has nothing to do with the protocol of the local election commission (See, for example, Ruelect). .

Efficienty of the election fraud
The appropriate combination of bribery of electors, the injection and robbery of ballots and the alteration of the final protocols may provide any result of the eleciton requested by the corruptioners.

At the election fraud, the criminal candidate may collect almost 100% of votes.

Punishment of the crimes
In civilized countries, the crimes committed the election fraud may be seriously punished .

In Russia, members of the anti-Russian criminal groups, that perform the election fraud, are only wished to be judged and punished. The penalty from one to three years of prison for the members of the election committees is suggested.

Some symbolic compensations to some victims of the election fraud are reported http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#_Toc482114377 CASE OF DAVYDOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (Application no. 75947/11) JUDGMENT// STRASBOURG. 30 May 2017. .. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION // 348. Article 41 of the Convention provides: // “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” // A. Damage // 349. Four of the applicants (Mr Davydov, Mr Belyakov, Mr Truskanov and Ms Pushkareva) claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. The other applicants did not seek any awards. // 350. The Government found the sums claimed to be excessive. // 351. The Court agrees that the applicants are victims of a violation of the right to free elections and that such a finding can lead to an award compensating for non-pecuniary damage. It awards the four applicants listed above EUR 7,500 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage. // B. Costs and expenses // 352. Six applicants claimed a total of EUR 8,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. They stated that Ms Napara had spent 50 billable hours on the case (at a rate of EUR 100 per hour) and Ms Moskalenko 25 billable hours (at a rate of EUR 150 per hour). // 353. The Government stressed that the applicants had no written contract with the representatives, which made their claim unsubstantiated. // 354. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his or her costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The absence of a written agreement to recover fees does not exclude the existence of a contractual obligation (see Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723/00, § 147, ECHR 2005‑IV). The Court observes that Ms Moskalenko and Ms Napara represented the applicants throughout the proceedings before the Court; in particular, they submitted their applications and submitted written observations on their behalf. Having regard to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 8,000 as claimed (EUR 5,000 to Ms Napara and EUR 3,000 to Ms Moskalenko), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. The amounts awarded shall be payable into the representatives’ bank accounts directly, as requested by the applicants. // C. Default interest // 355. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

Keywords
2011.12.04.Election, 2012.03.04.Election, 2012.03.04.Election in Tokyo, Churov saw, Corruption, Ella Pamfilova, Fascism, Fraud, Nuremberg-2, Pahanat, Pamfilova peak, Russia, Usurpation Vladimir Churov

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