Difference between revisions of "Ahtubinsk Airbase"
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This function is shown with blue curve in the figure at right. |
This function is shown with blue curve in the figure at right. |
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| − | The yellow curve shows more recent and |
+ | The yellow curve shows more recent and modest estimate from year 2023: |
\( L = 0.6 \ d^2 \) |
\( L = 0.6 \ d^2 \) |
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Latest revision as of 22:20, 11 June 2024
Ahtubinsk Airbase (Akhtubinsk Airbase, Авиабаза Ахтубинск) is military aerodrome at South of Moscovia.
Ahtubinsk Airbase is denoted also with the following symbols:
929-й Государственный лётно-испытательный центр Министерства обороны им. В.П. Чкалова [3][4]
Государственный лётно-испытательный центр Министерства обороны имени В. П. Чкалова[5]
Государственный лётно-испытательный центр имени В. П. Чкалова»
«ГЛИЦ им. В. П. Чкалова»
Ahtubinsk Airbase is mentioned as one of five most important strategic airbases of Moscovia. They are shown in the map by Телеканал ICTV [1]. From North to South:
68.1464,33.4514 Авиабаза Оленья, Olenia Airbase
54.2108,34.3642 Авиабаза Шайковка, Shaikovka Airbase
51.4838,46.2113 Авиабаза Энгельс, Engels Airbase
48.3108,46.2564 Авиабаза Ахтубинск, Ahtubinsk Airbase, Akhtubinsk Airbase
43.7829,44.5990 Авиабаза Моздок, Mozdok Airbase
These airbases are used in Putin world war; especially for the
Russian invasion into Ukraine. Each of these airbases is recognized as legitimate military target and object for the demilitarization and denazification. Such a destruction is considered as necessary condition to stop the Russian aggression.
Publications about Ahtubinsk Airbase (Akhtubinsk Airbase) and their intepretation are expected to be useful in construction (and testing) of historic models.
Location
Ahtubinsk Airbase is located (See the Second map at the top)
in a half-thousand km E from Ukraine
in a hundred km SE from Volgograd
in a 20 km SW from Kazakhstan
In 3-5 km NE from Ahtubinka and Volga rivera.
Address:
Ахтубинский р-н, Астраханская обл., Россия
Akhtubinsky District, Astrakhan Oblast, Russia
Coordinates:
48.3204,46.2339 Landing beacon
48.3137,46.2742 runway
48.3069,46.3170 Landing beacon
48.3067,46.2803 Hangar
48.3110,46.2329 Radar
48.3062,46.2287 Control tower
48.3242,46.1720 Landing beacon
48.3096,46.2027 runway
48.2934,46.2363 Landing beacon
48.3010,46.2018 warplane parking
48.3018,46.1922 Arsenal
48.3064,46.1843 Fuel storage
48.2956,46.2071 Fuel storage
48.2952,46.2088 Fuel storage
48.3103,46.1745 Stab
48.3076,46.1753 Gas station
48.2975,46.1922 Stab Vh15650 (Вч 15650)
48.2926,46.2199 Arsenal
48.2761,46.2057 Fuel storage
48.2752,46.2076 Gas station
48.3090,46.1851 Hangar
48.2964,46.1682 Railway junction
Warning: the identification of the objects listed os performed on the base of visual observation of map available in the free access. The independent confirmation or correction of the identifications should be appreciated.
The last map above should be interesting to compare with the similar map made after the bavovna(s) at the Ahtubinsk Airbase.
Personal
At least since year 2022, not so many workers of the Ahtubinsk Airbase are mentioned in publications. This can be interpreted as evidence that they participate in the Putin world war and afraid of extra-juridical execution before the collapse of RF and the international tribunal («Hague») after the collapse [6][7].
But some of the personal are still mentioned:
Бариев Радик Абрарович, (Bariev Radik Abrarovih, 1961.07.31, Белокоровичи, Ukraine), director since y.2009 [5]
Ерёмин Евгений Михайлович (Еremin Evgeni Mihailovich), инженер, 2024 [3][8]
Ечевский Владимир Владимирович (Echevski Vladimir Vladimirovich), старший инженер-испытатель, 2024 [3][9]
Лобанов Константин Николаевич (Lobanov Kobstabtin Nikolaevich), 2024 [3]
Николаев Сергей Владимирович (Nikolaev Sergei Vladimirovich) начальник отделения, 2024 [3]
One may expect to collect more information about the staff of the Ahtubinsk Airbase from the necrologies after its demilitarization and denazification; such a reciprocal action is expected to happen after the Russian attempt to do this with Ukraine during the Putin world war.
Putin world war
Several authors indicate the involvement of staff or the Ahtubinsk Airbase in the Putin world war and, especially, in the Russian invasion into Ukraine[1]
The main goals of the Putin world war are the following:
1. Breaking of international agreements (see «Budapest memorandum»). Forcing the civilized countries to designate Russia as state sponsor of terrorism, to designate Russia as terrorist state.
2. Forming of thousands of the war crimes who afraid of the «Nuremberg-2», international court, «Hague» [6][7] and for this reason have to be loyal to the Russian usurper.
3. Wasting the Russian population as the "cannon fodder" in order to force the Russian militaries to use nuclear weapon in such a way that a retaliatory strike would destroy Russia and kill most Russians so that Putin and his closest accomplices could be relatively safe (at least from a revolution) in his personal bunker; the Paradise, the Heaven conditions are arranged there; see «Мы попадём в рай а они сдохнут» (In Russian).
4. Use of the military topic as a test to reveal compatriots that are not loyal to usurper. Use the protests as a pretext, casus belli for the state terror - in the similar way, as the mass terror had been performed at Moscovia during the USSR, see «Back in the USSR», «The only good communist is a dead one» and «Большевики убили почти всех» (In Russian).
5. As an intermediate goal, the plundering of territories, the robbery, lootering, marauds appear as motivation for the aggressors, orks, that perform the invasion (see «От Аляски до Одесы», «2022.04.02.Мародеры», «Буча», «Ирпень», «Всех убьём, всех ограбим» , In Russian).
The putin plan of the «special operation» against Ukraine (Путинский план спецоперации) implies the transfer of hostilities to aggressor territory, destruction of Russian strategic and military objects, that is expected to leave the Russia army without fuel, without ammunition and without the so-called «cannon fodder», id est, without soldiers that agree to kill and to pe killed for the ambition of the Russian usurper. In particular, the putin's plan of the «special operation» includes the demilitarization and denazification of the Russian airbases, such as the Ahtubinsk Airbase.
Since year 2022, the Russian «special operation» against Ukraine unfolds according to this plan, following the «graphic of the special operation»[10][11][12][13], see «Специальная военная операция идет в строгом соответствии с графиком», in Russian. This graphic is shown in figure at right.
As the first approximation, the Russian military loss in Ukraine is extrapolated with quadratic function:
\( L = 0.8 \ d^2 \)
Here \(L\) is number of Russian orks demilitarized and denazified in Ukraine,
and \(d\) is time since the beginning of year 2022, measured in days.
This function is shown with blue curve in the figure at right.
The yellow curve shows more recent and modest estimate from year 2023:
\( L = 0.6 \ d^2 \)
The independent estimate of the Russian military loss by
minfin
[14] give similar values, they are shown with thin dark curve.
Up to year 2024, these data remain in the interval between the "blue" and "yellow" quadratic extrapolations.
The evidences of the Election fraud at Russia, see «Churov comb» («Пила Чурова») and «Pamfilova peak» («Пик Памфиловой») indicate, that of order of a million sovkopiteks vote for Putin and his party; other votes for these criminals are dropped by the corrupted election committees. From this very primitive and qualitative estimate, one may expect that Putin can recruit of order of a million orks for his war; other mobiks are expected to fire not only to the "enemies" shown by their commanders, but also to these commanders, see «Мятеж Вагнера», «Армия мобиков» (in Russian).
The two estimates above (graphic of the special operation and the estimate of total number of putinists) show that the putin's army is expected to end approximately in year 2025.
This should affect also the Ahtubinsk Airbase: the commanders will not be able to find
workers to maintain it.
It will be interesting to compare the speculation above with more recent publications about Ahtubinsk Airbase.
In particular, the advertisements about employment are expected to appear for replacement the workers (dead at the bavovnas at the Ahtubinsk Airbase or killed by the partizans in attempts to reduce the ability of Russian war crimes to bomb the Ukrainian cities).
Kazakhstan
At least since y.2022, Kazakhstan is discussed as possible next target (after Ukraine) for the Putin world war.
Two publications on the topic are copipasted below.
2022 Jamestown
https://jamestown.org/program/is-kazakhstan-going-to-follow-ukraine-as-putins-next-target/
Is Kazakhstan Going to Follow Ukraine as Putin’s Next Target?
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 19 Issue: 123
By: Paul Goble
August 11, 2022 05:35 PM
Many in Moscow are furious at Kazakhstan’s leadership for its ingratitude about Russia’s help in putting down a popular uprising in January 2022 (see EDM, January 20), for its increasing nationalism that is prompting ever more ethnic Russians to flee the country (see EDM, September 9, 2021) and for its efforts to attract foreign firms leaving Russia to Kazakhstan (see EDM, July 19). Additionally, the Kremlin has been bristled by Nur-Sultan’s plans to bypass Russia in exporting oil and gas (see EDM, June 28), its public unwillingness to back Moscow’s policies in Ukraine and, most recently, for reports that Kazakhstani firms are shipping weapons to Ukraine via third-party countries (Tsargrad.tv, August 10).
Relations between the two countries indeed appeared to have reached a new low on August 2, when a post attributed to Dmitry Medvedev, former president and current deputy head of the Russian Security Council, declared that “historically” what is today northern Kazakhstan was part of Russia—suggesting to some that Moscow would soon launch an invasion into its southern neighbor. The post itself was soon taken down, with hacking blamed for its posting in the first place. Yet, most Russian commentators have acknowledged that the now-deleted post reflects the views of many in the Kremlin—and even Medvedev himself judging from earlier commentaries he has not disowned (Politnavigator.net, August 2). As a result, increasing numbers of Kremlin analysts have suggested that Kazakhstan is likely to become Russian President Vladimir Putin’s next target, if not immediately, then following the victory he expects in Ukraine (E-vid.ru, August 9).
That Moscow is angry and that Nur-Sultan is worried are beyond doubt. A veritable war of words have occurred between the two sides, with Russian writers talking about Kazakhstan becoming “a second Ukraine,” and Kazakhstani commentators countering that the two countries are in the midst of “a bad divorce” (Novaya gazeta, December 21, 2021; see EDM, April 5). These comments are especially alarming because Russians have traditionally viewed Kazakhstan as one of their most reliable partners in the former Soviet space, and Kazakhstani citizens have viewed Russia as a country they cannot afford to offend because of the countries’ shared lengthy border and the still large ethnic Russian component of Kazakhstan’s population (see EDM, May 12). This summer, Moscow has shown its displeasure by stopping the flow of oil westward from Kazakhstan through its territory, and Nur-Sultan has countered by upgrading its military (Tengrinews, May 6, 19).
Three aspects of this situation certainly suggest the Kremlin may decide to move against Kazakhstan as it has with Ukraine. Nevertheless three others indicate that Moscow’s doing so is far less likely and that, regardless of the tensions that currently exist between the two enormous Eurasia countries, the possibility of a major military clash between them is quite low.
To be sure, three primary factors are pushing Russia toward a military move: First, from Moscow’s perspective, Kazakhstan has been moving along the same path as Ukraine—the result, Russian commentators say, of the fact that both represent the product of Western influence and thus must be countered in the same way (Regnum, July 29). Given Putin’s view that Ukraine is less a war with Kyiv than with the West, that is no small thing and certainly would appear to push him toward considering a move against Nur-Sultan, most likely seizing the northern third of Kazakhstan where ethnic Russians still form a large part of the population.
Second, if Kazakhstan continues to move away from Russia, the danger could crop up that Russians begin to believe Moscow will lose its influence across Central Asia as a whole, with China and the West picking up the pieces. Losing to either would undermine the Kremlin’s position generally, in the first case by giving China increased regional leverage and influence.
And third, in the absence of such a Russian move, Kazakhstan would likely become more similar to the rest of Central Asia and thus become a bridge, rather than a bulwark, for Islamist expansion northward into Russia itself (see EDM, November 19, 2013; August 17, 2021).
Even so, three even more compelling reasons point to why Russia is unlikely to take this action. First of all, its forces are tied down in Ukraine and likely will be for some time with an eventual resolution of the conflict. Starting a new war with a country the size of Kazakhstan would strain the military resources of the Kremlin to a breaking point. It would then have to back off somewhere else or declare an unpopular and risky general mobilization.
Second, the ethnic Russian share of Kazakhstan’s population is a declining asset for Moscow—not only has its size declined radically since the end of Soviet times, but it is projected to decline even more so over the next several decades. In 1989, 38 percent of Kazakhstan’s residents were ethnic Russians; now only 18 percent are, and the total is projected to fall to 10 percent or less by mid-century—both because it is an aging population dying out more rapidly than the Kazakh share of the population and because of continuing departures to Russia (Aif.ru, August 3). Absorbing all of Kazakhstan would make the Russian Federation far more non-Russian than it is today. Even absorbing only part of it would work against the “more Russian Russia” Putin wants.
Third—and by far the most important reason—Moscow has a long history of making threats and even taking actions, such as stopping the flow of oil, only to have Kazakhstan’s leaders call, reassure Putin of their unquestioned support and the Kremlin then pulls back on its rhetoric and actions. In the wake of Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s disparaging comments directly to Putin at their St. Petersburg meeting on June 17, words that many saw as an act of lèse-majesté or even an occasion for a military strike, the two men exchanged phone calls and the situation calmed down with both declaring that their friendship was intact and Russia lifted its blockade of Kazakhstani oil (E-vid.ru, August 9).
That is likely to happen again in the current environment, although the question does arise: How many times can the two countries go through this dance without something worse happening?
2023 Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/world/kazakhs-increasingly-wary-russias-belligerence-poll-2023-05-17/
Kazakhs increasingly wary of Russia's belligerence, poll shows By Reuters
May 17, 2023 6:46 PM GMT+9
May 17 (Reuters) - The number of Kazakhs who believe neighbouring Russia may invade the former Soviet republic has doubled over the past six months as the war in Ukraine continues, an opinion poll by Kazakh researchers showed on Wednesday.
The Central Asian nation of 20 million has close historical, economic and security ties with Moscow, but has maintained neutrality in the Ukrainian conflict, refusing to recognise Russia's annexation of parts of Ukraine's territory.
According to the poll of 1,100 respondents, carried out by non-government organisations MediaNet and PaperLab between May 3 and 12, almost 60% are also neutral with regards to the war, 12.8% support Russia and 21.1% support Ukraine, figures similar to those produced by a similar poll last December. However, the number of people who think Russia may also invade Kazakhstan has risen to 15% from 8.3% in the previous poll.
Nearly a third of respondents said their perception of Russia had worsened because of the war, over a half said it had not changed and only 4.7% said it had improved. Kazakhstan is home to about 3 million ethnic Russians and shares the world's longest continuous land border with Russia. Astana also has close ties with China, another giant neighbour, and the West, which has invested hundreds of billions of dollars into its oil and gas industry.
Reporting by Olzhas Auyezov; Editing by Nick Macfie
Ahtubinsk Airbase as target
The Ahtubinsk Airbase is in 20 km from the border with Kazakhstan. (See the second map at the top.)
One may expect this airbase to be used against Kazakhstan in this war.
On the other hand, the Kazakh administration is warned about such a danger. So, the Ahtubinsk Airbase can be completely destroyed by the Kazakh artillery at very beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion into Kazakhstan.
Editor failed to construct any historic model to predict the beginning (to not beginning) of the full-scale Russia-Kazakhstan war: Will it begin before the collapse of RF, when can it begin and how may it affect on the Ahtubinsk Airbase.
From general reasons, following the example of the World War II, one may expect that, during the Putin world war, in one day, Putin meets the need to fight on two fronts - as Adolf Hilter since year 1941. At least for year 2024, it is difficult to formulate such an expectation in a form of a Scientific concept.
Anyway, the Ahtubinsk Airbase is considered as legitimate military target during the Putin world war; at least during the Russian invasion into Ukraine. The news about Bavovnas at the Ahtubinsk Airbase are observed at least since year 2024. One of them is mentioned below.
2024.06.08.Bavovna
2024.06.08, the Ahtubinsk Airbase is attached. Some Russian warplanes are destroyed.
The indirect confirmation of the success of the 2024.06.08.Bavovna is observed and discussed at various sites. The original is copipasted below.
Меняйло Сергей Иванович
https://t.me/s/sergeymeniaylo/3584 .. Буду держать вас в курсе новостей. .. 2024.06.09. .. 17:04 .. Сергей Меняйло
Важно: убедительная просьба ко всем жителям республики не выкладывать в сеть фото и видео с места падения БПЛА, работы систем ПВО!
Объясню, почему этого нельзя делать: за всеми материалами, попадающими в сеть, пристально следит противник. Эти видео- и фотоотчеты тут же попадают в отчеты ВСУ как доказательства успешно проведенных атак. Далее информация тиражируется на иностранных ресурсах примерно с таким посылом: «Посмотрите, как хорошо и четко работает украинская армия! Ваши деньги тратятся не зря. Давайте еще!»
Визуальное сопровождение с мест атак беспилотников облегчает противнику дальнейшую проработку своих грязных задач, помогает раскрыть местоположение сил Минобороны и систем охраны важных стратегических объектов.
Давайте не будем играть на руку врагу!
17:53 .. Сергей Меняйло
Gallery
Warning
Publications about the Ahtubinsk Airbase are collected and analyses in TORI with scientific goals.
The interpretation suggested is not an appeal for the extra-judical exection of the personal of Ahtubinsk Airbase. The Editor does not fight against the putin regime, does not perform the rail war and even does not draw the red pentacles at doors of the Russian war crimes, as it is shown in figure at right; so, the Editor should not suggest such an activity for the compatriots.
More civilized methods to deal with the Russian war crimes (and other putin's accomplices [6]) are mentioned in articles
«Hague»,
«Nuremberg-2»,
«Payback» (in Russian),
«Ст.353 УК РФ» (in Russian).
From point of view of historical science, is it desirable to keep all the staff from the Ahtubinsk Airbase alive at least until the international court on the war crimes [6][7]. However, the Anti-Putin coalition has no need to take into account such an idea,
at least until the putin regime capitulates and his supporters and functionaries are captured.
The analysis above is not an attempt to suggest targets for the next bavovna (see picture at right) at the transfer of hostilities to aggressor territory.
The Editor is not supposed to teach the commanders of the anti-Putin coalition,
in which order and how is it better to demilitarize and to denazify the strategic and military targets of the aggressor in order to leave his army without cannon fodder, without warplanes, without ammunition and without fuel.
The Budapest memorandum does not put any restriction on the way to create the country that has signet that memorandum but brutally violates its guarantees. In this sense, any weapon may be used against the aggressor [15].
However, Editor may address to those people who ask:
«Why should we care about a memorandum signed many years ago?»
with the link to «The Jungle Book» [16].
From point of view of the Editor, the free people of civilized countries have no need to play the role of followers of Shere Khan and Tabaqui.
In such a way, the Editor keeps his right to call things with their proper names, to construct the historic models and to compare their predictions with more recent publications.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsgo9ln0Nd4 У границ НАТО! Что собой представляет авиабаза ОЛЕНЬЯ? Чем ВСУ могут туда достать Телеканал ICTV Почему российские стратегические бомбардировщики передислоцировались на Оленью? Почему Москва держит столько Тушек за Полярным кругом? И какую цену приходится платить – даже без украинских дронов? Разбирался Павел Васильев.
- ↑ https://www.google.com/maps/place/48°18'31.0%22N+46°12'15.0%22E/@48.3129138,46.2112695,6468m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m4!3m3!8m2!3d48.308611!4d46.204167?hl=en&entry=ttu 48°18'31.0"N 46°12'15.0"E 48.308611, 46.204167 Akhtubinsky District, Astrakhan Oblast, Russia
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 https://mai.ru/content/org/index.php?ID=24243 929-й Государственный лётно-испытательный центр Министерства обороны им. В.П. Чкалова (2024) Информация о сотрудниках Ечевский Владимир Владимирович старший инженер-испытатель Николаев Сергей Владимирович начальник отделения Лобанов Константин Николаевич Ерёмин Евгений Михайлович инженер Контакты Ахтубинск, Астраханская область, 416500, Россия
- ↑ https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Государственный_лётно-испытательный_центр_Министерства_обороны_имени_В._П._Чкалова ГЛИЦ (929-й Государственный лётно-испытательный центр Министерства обороны Российской Федерации имени В. П. Чкалова, 929 ГЛИЦ ВВС) — российское авиационное научно-исследовательское и испытательное военное учреждение. Это основное учреждение ВВС Вооруженных Сил России, в котором перед поступлением на вооружение проходит испытания военная авиационная техника и средства авиационного вооружения.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 http://www.biograph.ru/index.php/news/7976-bariev60 К 60-летию Героя Российской Федерации генерал-майора авиации Бариева Радика Абраровича 31 июля 60-летний юбилей празднует выдающийся летчик-испытатель, Герой Российской Федерации, заслуженный лётчик-испытатель РФ, кандидат военных наук, профессор Академии военных наук, начальник Государственного лётно-испытательного центра Министерства обороны РФ имени В. П. Чкалова, генерал-майор Бариев Радик Абрарович. ..
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 https://ria-m.tv/news/305254/skabeeva_zapugivaet_rossiyan_gaagoyu_posobnik_putinskogo_rejima_ili_mimo_prohodil_—_vinovatyimi_budem_vse.html Скабеева запугивает россиян Гаагою: "Пособник путинского режима или мимо проходил — виноватыми будем все" 01 декабря 2022, 06:05 | Российская пропагандистка Ольга Скабеева пугает зрителей тем, что в случае поражения России в войне против Украины всем россиянам грозит Гаагский трибунал. Соответствующее заявление Скабеева сделала в эфире пропагандистского теле-шоу. "Если вдруг, не дай Бог, что-то произойдет и наша страна не сможет одержать победу, тогда надо исходить из того, что претензии будут предъявлены каждому без исключения. Безотносительно – на территории РФ он находится или за пределами. И те, кто за пределами, наверное, мгновенно будут арестованы. Пособник он путинского режима или мимо проходил – неважно, виноватыми будем все", – придумала пропагандистка.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 https://www.business-gazeta.ru/news/573872 29 ноября 2022, 19:24 Симоньян: «Если мы умудримся проиграть, Гаага условная или конкретная ждет даже дворника» Главный редактор телеканала RT Маргарита Симоньян в эфире у Владимира Соловьева рассказала, почему России нельзя проиграть в противостоянии с Украиной и в целом с Западом. // «Я хочу сказать, что, если мы умудримся проиграть, Гаага условная или конкретная ждет даже дворника, который брусчатку за кремлевской стеной подметает. Что нам от того, что еще один район Киева останется без света или не останется? Масштаб катастрофы для нашей страны, если мы умудримся это сделать, даже представить нельзя. Гааги бояться — в лес не ходить», — заявила Симоньян.
- ↑ https://mai.ru/content/people/index.php?ID=24244 Ерёмин Евгений Михайлович Место работы 929-й Государственный лётно-испытательный центр Министерства обороны им. В.П. Чкалова Должность инженер (2024)
- ↑ https://mai.ru/content/people/index.php?ID=121542 Ечевский Владимир Владимирович Место работы 929-й Государственный лётно-испытательный центр Министерства обороны им. В.П. Чкалова Должность старший инженер-испытатель Публикации, документы и материалы Наименование Тип Год Реверсовооруженность и эффективность применения реверса тяги самолета Статья 2021
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/2022/03/03/17376199.shtml 03 марта 2022, 20:28 Путин заявил, что спецоперация на Украине идет по плану Анастасия Лежепекова Президент России Владимир Путин, выступая на заседании Совбеза, заявил, что спецоперация РФ на Украине «идет по плану». Об этом сообщает ТАСС. Глава государства сообщил об этом после минуты молчания по погибшим в ходе операции военнослужащим. «Хочу сказать, что специальная военная операция идет в строгом соответствии с графиком, по плану. Все поставленные задачи успешно решаются», — сказал президент. ..
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 https://ria.ru/20220517/spetsoperatsiya-1788974622.html Спецоперация идет по плану, заявил Песков 11:42 17.05.2022 Пресс-секретарь президента Песков заявил, что спецоперация идет по плану Механики производят загрузку боеприпасов в самолет Су-25 Грач - РИА Новости, 1920, 17.05.2022 © РИА Новости Механики производят загрузку боеприпасов в самолет Су-25 "Грач". Архивное фото МОСКВА, 17 мая - РИА Новости. Спецоперация РФ на Украине идёт по плану и эффективно, военные проявляют героизм, и нет сомнений, что все планы будут достигнуты, заявил пресс-секретарь президента РФ Дмитрий Песков."Совсем недавно президент говорил о том, что все идет по плану. Все идет по плану. Достаточно эффективно. Вы видите успехи наших военных, вы видите героизм, который проявляют наши воины, поэтому никаких сомнений в том, что все цели поставленные будет достигнуты, нет", - сказал он журналистам.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 https://rtvi.com/news/spetsoperatsiya-idet-po-planu-peregovory-rossii-i-ukrainy-ostavlyayut-zhelat-luchshego-chto-rasskaza/ Спецоперация «идет по плану», переговоры оставляют «желать лучшего». Что рассказал Песков. 18.04.2022 / 14:04 .. О ходе спецоперации. «Специальная военная операция продолжается. Президент [Путин] совсем недавно сказал, что она идет по плану» (здесь и далее цитата по ТАСС).
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 https://tass.ru/politika/15596227 Песков заявил, что спецоперация на Украине идет по плану // Представитель Кремля отметил, что "все цели будут достигнуты" МОСКВА, 30 августа. /ТАСС/. Специальная военная операция РФ на Украине продолжается в соответствии с имеющимися планами, и все ее цели будут достигнуты, заявил журналистам во вторник пресс-секретарь президента РФ Дмитрий Песков. (2022)
- ↑ https://index.minfin.com.ua/ua/russian-invading/casualties/ Втрати російської армії в Україні (updated daily since y.2022)
- ↑ https://topwar.ru/209672-ravno-ili-pozdno-zapad-otpravit-na-ukrainu-takticheskoe-jadernoe-oruzhie-potomu-chto-uzhe-ne-mozhet-ostanovitsja.html Рано или поздно Запад отправит на Украину тактическое ядерное оружие, потому что уже не может остановиться 27 января 2023. Запад попал в ситуацию, при которой поставляет оружие Украине в первую очередь потому, что уже не может его не поставлять. Аргументация поставок: «помощь демократии на Украине в плане защиты от российской агрессии». ..
- ↑ https://www.gutenberg.org/files/236/236-h/236-h.htm#link2H_4_0001 Rudyard Kipling. THE JUNGLE BOOK. Release Date: January 16, 2006 [EBook #236] Last Updated: October 6, 2016. .. Akela lifted his head again and said, “He has eaten our food. He has slept with us. He has driven game for us. He has broken no word of the Law of the Jungle.”// “Also, I paid for him with a bull when he was accepted. The worth of a bull is little, but Bagheera’s honor is something that he will perhaps fight for,” said Bagheera in his gentlest voice.// “A bull paid ten years ago!” the Pack snarled. “What do we care for bones ten years old?”// “Or for a pledge?” said Bagheera, his white teeth bared under his lip. ..
2022.07.22 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHYrQUSR270 Россия стягивает на аэродром в Ахтубинск дефицитные ракеты "Кинжал" для обстрелов Украины PrimeCrimeRU Jul 22, 2022. Российские оккупанты разместили на аэродроме 929-го Государственного летно-испытательного центра Министерства обороны имени В. П. Чкалова, который находится в Ахтубинске Астраханской области не менее 30 ракет Х-47 "Кинжал". Об этом сообщает СтратКом ВСУ. // "Такая концентрация ракет этого типа может говорить о том, что россияне могут их использовать для нанесения ударов по некоторым важным объектам на территории Украины", - говорится в сообщении. // В ведомстве отмечают, что всего на вооружении ВКС находится около 40 Х-47. Их использование, как добавляют в Страткоме, может свидетельствовать об ограниченном ракетном ресурсе РФ. // "За весь период войны эти ракеты использовались для удара по территории Украины только один раз. Если пойдут применение, это будет показательно, насколько их ресурс сжат", - добавляют в ведомстве. Как сообщали Українські Новини, Россия использовала 60% своих запасов высокоточного оружия, но остались большие запасы советского.
Keywords
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